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1 Introduction
The connections between development, corruption
and the increasingly globalized financial system are
not yet fully understood. In this paper we explore
what we call the offshore interface, consisting of tax
havens and Offshore Finance Centres (OFCs),
which lies between the 'developed countries' and
LDCs. We explore the idea that the existence of the
offshore interface facilitates, and may even encour-
age, corruption onshore.
Research on the potential relationship between cor-
ruption and offshore finance is highly problematic
given the illegitimacy of corruption, and the
secrecy and confidentiality of offshore financial
activities. OFC customers, even legitimate ones
such as transnational corporations, demand a wall
of secrecy between themselves and their revenue
authorities, governments and sometimes their own
families. Additionally, two further aspects can hin-
der data collection. First, OFCs attempt continu-
ally to portray themselves in the best possible light,
and second, financial services are based on the
fragile notion of 'confidence'. Thus, major financial
players promote the respectability of their own
OFC with the support of the host government.
This leads to a reluctance to reveal information
about offshore activities, resulting in a lack of
international comparative data. These measure-
ment problems are similar to researching the so-
called 'black' or hidden economy, so that estimates
of size are often no more than 'best guesses'.1
We begin by examining the operation of offshore
centres, and then discuss private banking, capital
flight and the nature of the offshore interface.
Finally, we consider the impact on economic devel-
opment of the linkage between the offshore inter-
face and corruption.
2 Offshore Centres
2.1 The uses of offshore centres
An OFC is defined as:
a centre that hosts financial activities that are
separated from major regulating units (states)
by geography andlor by legislation. This may
For example, US government estimates of illegal funds
going offshore in 1983 ranged from $US 9 billion to
over sus 50 billion (Picciotto, 1992: 127).
be a physical separation, as in an island terri-
tory, or (a legal separation) within a city such as
London or the New York International Banking
Facilities.
(Hampton 1994: 237)
As Table 1 illustrates, OFCs are often located in
small places: inland or mountain enclaves
(Liechtenstein, Andorra), coastal enclaves
(Monaco), or most commonly, in small islands.
Although there is some confusion with tax havens,
OFCs can be defined as sites hosting a range of eco-
nomic activïties (private and wholesale banking,
offshore trusts and funds, holding companies, cap-
tive insurance and shipping registers), whereas tax
havens are based upon tax differentials with other
countries.
There is special difficulty with double counting. If we
add up the published OFCs' bank deposits, the total
would be misleading given the amount of inter-bank
lending so that the same initial deposit could appear on
the hooks of several banks across the world.
Additionally, the money held in offshore trusts is even
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Offshore centres have become internationally
prominent since the 1960s although some centres
(e.g. Switzerland, Monaco and the Lebanon) existed
before this. Bank deposits in tax havens increased
from an estimated $US 11 billion in 1968 to sus
385 billion in 1978 (OECD 1987). Difficulties of
estimation notwithstanding2, by 1991 estimates of
the total size of the global offshore business had
risen to over one trillion US dollars (Kochen 1991).
Despite the lack of published data due to OFC
secrecy, it is possible to produce partial tabulations
that attempt to characterize offshore centres. The
following tables use three categories of OFC: func-
tional, notional and compound. A functional OFC
can be defined as the place where financial activities
physically take place, where full branches of
banks, plus other financial services such as fund
harder to estimate as trust managers do not have to
publish figures. In Jersey, for example, official bank
deposits totalled £64.9 billion by year end 1994, but
OFC respondents suggested that the size of the Jersey
trust business was approximately two to three times
larger at £130-190 billion.
Table 1 Main offshore financial centres
Caribbean &
South Atlantic
Angui lia
Antigua
Bahamas
Barbados
Belize
Bermuda
British Virgin Islands
Cayman Islands
Costa Rica
Dominica
Grenada
Montserrat
Netherlands Antilles
Nevis & St.Kitts
Panama
St. Lucia
St. Vincent
Turks & Caicos Islands
Source author
Europe, Middle East,
Africa
Andorra
Bah rain
Channel Islands
Cyprus
Gibraltar
Isle of Man
Liberia
Liechtenstein
Luxembourg
Malta
Monaco
Netherlands
Switzerland
United Arab Emirates
Asia-Pacific
Cook Islands
Hong Kong
Labuan
Marshall Islands
Nauru
Philippines
Singapore
Varivatu
Western Samoa
management, trust companies etc. are sited.
Functional OFCs employ a significant proportion
of local labour (over 12 per cent of the labour
force), and OFC activities contribute over 25 per
cent of GDP (Table 2).
Notional OFCs are where 'shell' or brass-place
offices of banks make book entries of financial
transactions. However, their employment and
GDP data is fragmented and incomplete, so that
all we can note is a nominal contribution to both
(under 3 per cent and under 10 per cent
respectively).
Compound OFCs host a mixture of functional and
notional activities. This category includes centres
(e.g. the Bahamas) that have an increasing number
of shell offices that eventually become fully opera-
tional branches. Such OFCs employ a smaller pro-
portion of the local labour force than functional
OFCs (3-10 per cent) and contribute an estimated
10-24 per cent of GDP (Table 3).
The overall lack of data on OFCs means that this
statistical information is indicative rather than
authoritative, but it does give a sense of the relative
scales of the main OFCs. When this partial infor-
mation is combined with the estimated total size of
offshore business (over one trillion US Dollars) it
provides some idea of the significance of offshore
finance in the global economy
At present three regional economic blocs seem to
be forming: the EU, NAFTA and Asia-Pacific.
Each bloc has a global financial centre within it; the
cities of London, New York and Tokyo, the 'three-
legged stool' of world finance (Hamilton 1986:
111). Each of these centres has a group of satellite
OFCs around it servicing its catchment areas.
When deposits are attracted to an OFC, they are
then passed through to the deeper capital markets
in the global centres, acting as a 'turntable' for
funds (Johns 1983: 225). However, this relation-
ship is somewhat different in the Asia-Pacific
region, where Tokyo has a different activity base
from New York and London, such that Hong Kong
and Singapore act more like regional centres than
normal OFCs.
Offshore finance has been seen as a development
option by two types of LDC: first, middle-to-higher
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income LDCs, particularly the NICs and near-NICs
of Asia (l-long Kong, Singapore and South Korea,
the cities of Bangkok and Taipei, and Malasia
Labuan island) and, second, small island economies
and territories located in the Caribbean (the
Bahamas, the Netherlands Antilles), the Pacific
(Vanuatu), the India Ocean (Mauritius) or around
the edge of Europe (the Channel Islands, Gibraltar,
Malta).
2.2 Private banking, capital flight
and the offshore interface
Arguably the most significant OFC activity in the
1990s is now offshore banking, specifically the
rapid growth area of 'international private banking'
encompassing bank accounts, trust and offshore
companies. This can be attributed to two con-
nected trends: the changing international financial
environment on the supply side, and rising demand
for private banking. First, in the late 1980s the syn-
dicated loans business (Eurocurrency markets) and
wholesale banking slowed down, reflecting rising
real interest rates and the so-called Third World
debt crisis. Many international banks thus returned
to private banking for 'high net wealth' individuals
and pursued them aggressively to replace declining
wholesale loan activities with fee-based private
banking.
Second, global demand for private banking facilities
has increased. In 1990 the number of wealthy indi-
viduals worldwide (with investible private wealth of
over $US 1 million each) was estimated by Citicorp
at around eight million, and this figure appears to
be growing (OFM 1990: 10) The increase in
demand comes from regions undergoing rapid
industrialization with concomitant wealth creation
such as South East and East Asia and areas threat-
ened by increasing political instability, the so-called
'new world disorder' of the 1990s. For example,
the break-up of the former Soviet Union led to
spectacular capital flight which in 1994 was haem-
orrhaging at a rate of an estimated $US 1 billion per
month (Burns 1994).
Elsewhere, elites in many LDCs had long placed
assets offshore, but there appears to have been a
Recent estimates suggest a private banking market in
Latin America alone of over sus 450 billion of investible
assets (Timewell, 1995: 58).
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recent acceleration of such capital flight. Examples,
include the offshore fortunes of Haiti's 'Baby Doc'
Duvalier, estimated at sUS 300-900 million, the
Philippines' President Marcos with an alleged $US
2-10 billion (Naylor 1987; Robinson 1994), and
many others including Latin American cases where
funds flowed to Caribbean OFCs and then onwards
to Florida real estate.3
More recently, Russian assets held externally in
Western banks totalled around $US 18 billion in
1993 (approximately doubling from 1992), of
which around $US 4.4 billion is held in London
(Tett 1994). Russian use of the Cyprus OFC for
'brass plate' offshore companies, bank accounts and
offshore branches of Russian banks appears to be
increasing. The problem for Western banks is how
much of this flight capital is criminal in origin,
derived from increasing 'Mafianization' and corrup-
tion within the former Soviet economy and being
laundered through OFCs.
Capital flight is widespread and has a large techni-
cal literature4 but it depends on a fundamental need
for secrecy in the recipient centre, the OFC. Users
of international private banking often blatantly dis-
regard the law concerning offshore bank accounts
in their own country and OFC firms use devious
(ingenious) methods to retain customers in sensi-
tive locations such as Israel, South Africa (before the
mid-1990s) or the Russian Federation in the 1990s.
An illuminating example of this is a technique
employed to disguise the correspondence from an
OFC bank to a private customer using plain, hand-
written envelopes with an ordinary postage stamp
rather than a normal business style envelope and
machine-franked postmark. The disguised letter or
account statement is then sent by private bag to the
OFC banks head office in a large capital city for
mailing so that the correspondence appears to be a
private letter and does not bear the postmark of a
known OFC.5
Capital flight and international private banking are
connected to the large external debt of certain
LDCs, but there are two competing explanations for
this phenomenon: what Boyce 1992 dubs the
'Baker-banker' orthodoxy of the Western banks and
For example, see Boyce 1992 and Nyatepe-Coo 1993.
Information derived from a personal interview.
the IMF and a critical view In the first view, signif-
icant external debt is due to LDC governments' eco-
nomic mismanagement (including exchange rate
overvaluation and inflationary policies). The rela-
tionship between capital flight and international
prïvate banking is thus indirect, that flight being
a symptom of the LDC's crisis as money flees to
more economically 'rational' locations. In contrast,
Diaz-Alejandro (1984) takes a critical view and
argues that Western banks set out deliberately to
attract international private banking (that is capital
flight), and that capital flight is partly the result of
the increasingly globalized financial system.
Similarly, Boyce (1992) uses the metaphor of the
'revolving door' to analyse capital flight from the
Philippines, arguing that capital flight and external
debt are explicitly and intimately interconnected.
However, we can go further than Boyce's 'revolving
door' to consider how offshore finance and capital
flight are related to the emerging global system.
This developing relationship is what I have called
the 'offshore interface' and is wider than just the
location of flight capital. OFCs are places of con-
vergence of many capital currents. The offshore
interface is where what Roberts (1994) calls 'ficti-
tious capital' or wholesale banking meets 'furtive
capital' (private banking and capital flight/retail
banking). In addition, it is also a global-local inter-
face: between the developed countries and LDCs,
and between corrupt transactions and legitimate
ones.
Roberts (1994) identifies the paradox of offshore
finance as being both at the margin and at the cen-
tre of global capitalism. Given that many OFCs are
not independent nation states this paradox is also
borne out by their somewhat peculiar relationship
with a nearby large power. As dependencies they
are both 'within and without' the mainland, having
some local autonomy, but linked to the large
onshore state. This peculiar relationship partly cre-
ates the offshore interface, but is itself open to pen-
etration by internationally mobile financial capital -
that is international banks (Hampton 1996). This
offshore interface then attracts flight capital often
associated with 'onshore' corruption.
Thus, the development requirements of certain
small economies and the uneven global financial
topography (especially regulatory and fiscal) have
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been exploited by international financial capital.
The phenomenal 1960s growth of the 'offshore'
Eurocurrency markets initially centred in London
created a massive pool of unregulated, highly
mobile private capital. OPEC funds, swollen by the
early 1970s oil price rises, in combination with low
real interest rates created excess systemic liquidity
which the international banks attempted to mop up
by extensive loans to LDCs. These developments
were facilitated by significant technical advances in
telecommunications and computer power that
enabled the rapid transfer of funds from centre to
centre across the globe.
A significant proportion of these international loans
to LDCs were creamed off corruptly through rent-
seeking activities by local elites in the form of over-
payments, bribes etc. The funds thus obtained
were then transferred into banks located in the off-
shore interface, ironically often to 'private banking'
branches of the very same international banks that
had issued the international loan to the LDC coun-
try in the first place.
The offshore interface means that an extremely fine
distinction exists between varïous OFC activities,
particularly between legal and illegal, as both types
require strict secrecy and are subject to low taxa-
tion. Thus, it provides a continual potential for
abuse by individuals, corporations and the state,
although what may be perceived as abuse in one
country may be a legitimate business activity else-
where. This ethipl relativism is illustrated by the
offshore industry's use of catch-all euphemisms
such as 'private banking' or 'asset protection'.
Offshore 'private banking' facilities can also be used
for money laundering, although the older func-
tional centres appear more selective in their clien-
tele. As centres 'gentrify', funds of questionable
origin tend to move to less selective, newer OFCs
(usually notional centres). Alternatively, there may
be a layering of shell companies (as in the 'Baby
Doc' Duvalier case) to hide the real origin of certain
funds, acting as a further interface between legality
and illegality
Governments in developed countries have also used
the offshore interface (offshore bank accounts and
companies) as money boxes for their security ser-
vices' covert operations in LDCs and elsewhere to
supply funds to foreign governments, opposition
parties or terrorist groups (e.g. the well-docu-
mented CIAs dirty wars in Central and Latin
America).6 Although national security is a sensitive
issue for governments, this continuing use of OFCs
for clandestine purposes may explain governments'
apparent willingness to ignore nearby OFCs, or
more generally to tolerate the existence of the off-
shore interface.
Jersey is a good example of the offshore interface in
action. As an OFC with a high level of bank secrecy,
the island is open to various abuses including flows
from onshore corruption and drug proceeds. Some
interview respondents within the OFC sector seri-
ously questioned the island reputable image and
the efficiency of the OFC's regulation: 'Jersey over-
states that it is a clean OFC'; 'Jersey is a prostitute
[andi welcomes money with open arms'; 'lt is
extremely naive to think that Jersey is not targeted
by international financial criminals'; 'lt is a potential
back door for hot money'.
Not surprisingly, respondents who were govern-
ment employees talked in terms of Jersey being
'responsible', 'sensible' or taking the 'quality road'.
However, since the 1980s a variety of court cases
have highlighted how the Jersey OFC has been
abused. The 'Baby Doc' Duvalier case illustrated the
offshore interface being abused by a member of the
LDC elite. What follows is a speculative recon-
struction based on various pieces of evidence.
The first stage, once Duvalier had corruptly
obtained funds in Haiti (such as cash payments for
fictitious 'services', cheques paid to himself and his
family etc.) he set up various offshore 'private' bank
accounts. Many of these were in Switzerland, an
estimated $US 370 million held there alone
(Ferguson 1987: 131). Second, under instruction,
a London firm of solicitors formed a Jersey offshore
company, Boncardo Limited, with nominee direc-
tors in Sark (another small Channel Island) to mask
the true 'beneficial owner', that is, Duvalier himself.
Next, instructions were passed via Boncardo
Limited to set up company bank accounts in vari-
ous offshore banks in Jersey and elsewhere includ-
ing BNP, Lloyds, Hong Kong and Shanghai, and the
For example, see Bloch and Fitzgerald 1983 and ' Sources include Robinson 1994 and various articles in
Naylor 1987. the Jersey Weekly Post.
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Royal Trust Bank. Finally, Duvalier, now in exile in
a French villa, obtained Boncardo company cheque
books for its accounts held at various banks,
enabling him to spend his corrupt gains.
Meanwhile, the new Haitian government had
started to track down Duvalier's illegal offshore for-
tune. In the process, its lawyers discovered
£77,400 in one Boncardo Limited account in BNP
This eventually led to a case in the Royal Court of
Jersey in July 1988 and a judicial award against the
Duvalier family of $US 120 million However, the
coup in Haiti in September 1988 led to a pro-
Duvalier government and the case was not followed
through.7
Secrecy, low taxes and political stability attract legit-
imate business to OFCs, but they are also condi-
tions sought by illegal business. This raises the
question of whether such abuses can be stopped
effectively given this overlap of attraction. The pro-
portion of OFC business originating from illegal
sources is unknown, so it is difficult to evaluate
examples like the above as representatïve or anom-
alous. A defence often used by the offshore indus-
try is that abuses happen even in reputable finance
centres like London and New York, since once
money is in the international payments system it is
very hard to track. Thus money from an illegal
source, or corrupt payment, once paid into a bank
in a less regulated jurisdiction such as the Turks and
Caicos Islands, can ultimately be transferred to a
'reputable' OFC such as Jersey In practice, the
route taken would involve a chain of OFCs and
onshore finance centres, possibly using several
trusts and offshore companies. This defence places
the onus on the international regulatory system and
can be used to justify relative inaction both in the
OFC and by the international banks themselves.
3 Impact on Economic
Development
The growth of the offshore interface may bring cer-
tain negative developmental consequences: by
undermining the legitimacy of states, reducing
development possibilities and transforming eco-
nomic activities to rentier ones. First, it may con-
tribute to the possibility of corruption becoming
seen as a 'normal' activity which undermines local
laws in LDCs (Nyatepe-Coo 1993; Watts 1994).
The blurring of lines between the corrupt and the
normal is also apparent in the developed countries
in the 1990s - for example, in the events surround-
ing the fall of the Berlusconi government in Italy,
the Belgian arms scandal, or cases of business
malfeasance in the UK. More subtly, as Will Hutton
argues, the emergence of the offshore interface and
an increasing global economy, by facilitating rapid
movements of capital, may be contributing to a
more generalized weakening of the credibility and
legitimacy of public agencies and social institutions.
The burgeoning international marketplace -
destabilizing currency flows, using offshore
havens to avoid tax - is hostile to expressions of
common and public interest. Private interests
have too easily slipped the national leash and
have used the ungoverned world beyond
national frontiers to undermine what they
regard as tiresome, inefficient and bureaucratic
efforts to assert the moral and social dimension
in human affairs.
(Hutton 1995: 26)
Similarly, Bennett argues that the growth of the
informal sector and capital flight in Guyana and
Jamaica was
the rejection of the moral and legal authority of
the government on the part of a broad cross-
section of society in both countries ... a major
breakdown in state authority Many of those
whose activities would normally have fallen
within the context of the formal sector simply
chose to ignore the formal state apparatus and
its rules and regulations.
(Bennett 1995: 240-241)
Bennett argues that the increased growth of market
forces enforced by international financial agencies
weakens the regulatory capacity of states and allows
privileged groups to secure advantages corruptly
and deposit their ill-gotten gains offshore.
in other cases, the offshore interface may contribute
to political decay by intensifying anomalous or cor-
rupt relationships between government and busi-
ness. In Taiwan, for example, the dominant
Kuomintang Party (KMT) is seen as one of the
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island largest industrial conglomerates with
around seven holding companies controlling vari-
ous activities from cement and petrochemicals to
telecommunications. According to official figures,
the KMT's registered assets totalled around £23 bil-
lion at the end of 1992 (Tyson 1994). In Vietnam,
despite economic growth of around 9 per cent per
annum in 1994, 'corruption has become a serious
hindrance to economic development' (Hung Tran of
Deutsche Bank Research, Frankfurt, cited by
Montagnon 1995). Given the wall of secrecy, the
Vietnamese elites' deposits cannot be tracked off-
shore to particular OFCs, but it is likely that the
various sweeteners, 'fees' and commissions end up
in the offshore interface.
Second, continuing corruption and consequent
capital flight from the LDC can reduce development
options since there is a continuous siphoning of
resources away from the poorest in society and a
widening gap between the wealthy elite and the
urban (and rural) poor (Watts 1994).
Third, increasing corruption and capital flight are
connected to a sea change in basic economic activ-
ity, away from productive uses of capital such as
manufacturing, to rentier uses, both for the state
and the individual (Murphy et aI. 1993). For
Nigeria, for example, Nyatepe-Coo (1993) and
Watts (1994) draw an explicit link between its oil
revenues, increasing corruption and massive capital
flight, and note the oil producing companies'
increasing connection to the international financial
system from the 1970s. The offshore interface is an
important mechanism of such connections.
As regards the OFC host country, there is the possi-
bility of contagion and increasing corruption
amongst its own residents. The 1985 imprison-
ment of the Chief Minister of the Turks and Caicos
Islands and two other senior officials on drugs
charges provides a good example of this contagion
(Thorndike 1987). The opening up of a small juris-
diction to influential and well-endowed external
agents may increase local opportunities for corrup-
tion and crime. New OFCs are typically less selec-
tive in the business accepted, compared with older
OFCs. The shake-out of dubious and illegal opera-
tors from the more 'reputable' centres may pressur-
ize them to use new OFCs that may not be tainted
by known connections to money laundering. The
cases of certain Caribbean OFCs, including
Anguilla, the Bahamas, the Cayman Islands,
Montserrat and Panama confirm the contagious
nature of large scale imported corruption (Walter
1985).
4 Conclusion
In the offshore interface, the connections between
OFCs, corruption, capital flight and economic
development are complex. This is only a prelimi-
nary account but certain points emerge for future
examination. The rapid pace of change, especially
that of increasing financial globalization, the dereg-
ulation of international finance since the late 1970s,
and the arrival of new technologies have resulted in
rapid capital flows through the offshore interface.
Private banking in OFCs, underwritten by strict
bank secrecy legislation, facilitates the easy move-
ment of the gains from corrupt transactions, so that
there appears to be an increasing synergy between
the offshore interface, globalization and onshore
corruption.
If this is so, what can be done? One immediate
problem is the pivotal role of the international
banks both as wholesale lenders to LDCs and pri-
vate bankers for their wealthy elites. Arguably these
roles are activated by flows of capital partly gener-
ated from rent-seeking, corrupt behaviour by elites
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in certain countries. This ambivalent, pivotal role
of international banks has created obstacles to the
implementation of significant change. Such banks
perceive the offshore interface as basically unprob-
lematic, except that they might endorse some nom-
inal offshore regulation.
From the point of view of governments in devel-
oped countries, in 1995 the OECD Task Force on
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